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Abstract
We present a graph-theoretic model of consumer choice, where final decisions are shown
to be influenced by information and knowledge, in the form of individual awareness, dis-
criminating ability, and perception of market structure. Building upon the distance-based
Hotelling’s differentiation idea, we describe the behavioral experience of several prototypes
of consu.pdfmers, who walk a hypothetical cognitive path in an attempt to maximize their
satisfaction. Our simulations show that even consumers endowed with a small amount of in-
formation and knowledge may reach a very high level of utility. On the other hand, complete
ignorance negatively affects the whole consumption process. In addition, rather unexpect-
edly, a random walk on the graph reveals to be a winning strategy, below a minimal threshold
of information and knowledge.
Keywords: Product differentiation; Hotelling; consumer behavior; information; knowledge;
random choice.
1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Chamberlin [1], the economics literature on monopolistically compet-
itive markets has been rooted on the idea of product differentiation [2]: goods are provided by
many producers in several versions and models, despite they aim at satisfying the very same
need. Such a market framework can be easily experienced everyday in real-life markets, where
several products compete with each other in offering very similar services to the final consumer.
Product differentiation has been studied from two perspectives: (i) horizontal, often referred
to as spatial differentiation [3, 4], and (ii) vertical [5, 6, 7, 8]. If a good is defined as a bundle
of characteristics (in the sense of Lancaster [9]), the distinction between horizontal and vertical
differentiation is that the former refers to goods with different features and the same qualitative
level, whereas the latter takes into account differences in quality. However, as Cremer and
Thisse have shown [10], results of Hotelling-type models and vertical differentiation models are
basically equivalent. In this paper we assume that the differentiation has a comprehensive
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characterization: in fact, different features and qualitative levels will be described in a unique
multidimensional environment.1
Consumer’s behavioral choice is studied in the literature from several, yet complementary,
points of view. From a buyer’s perspective, differentiation among goods is advantageous insofar
as it helps in seeking a feasible good offering the highest satisfaction. In this sense, an increase
in differentiation is usually associated to a positive value for buyers, because it increases the
possibility of a making a selection that is close to an ideal target.2 Monopolistic competition
and oligopoly characterize the largest part of the real market experience. These two market
structures share many common characteristics; however, they differ from each other in the
way the total market output is looked at. In fact, oligopolistic firms explicitly consider the
effect of their role in determining the total market output, whereas monopolistically competitive
firms consider the aggregate market output as exogenously given in the process of setting their
individual production, [14]. We focus our attention on the demand side of a monopolistically
competitive market, where firms’ supply composition is taken as an exogenous environmental
configuration. Our goal is to study a consumer’s individual choice process, that is, to analyze
the way in which she selects a final product among several version of it supplied by different
brands. To this aim, we make the (non-simplifying) assumption that the consumer considers
quality, features, and prices as a unified multi-criteria discrimination concept.
Market failure due to asymmetric information occurs when the buyer and the seller have two
different informative sets and the more aware of them tries to extract a supplementary benefit
at the expenses of the other [15, 16, 17] . Indeed, the case of a consumer who does not know the
complete characterization of the goods she needs must be considered: that consumer chooses
blinded by her ignorance [18]. The result is a lower level of satisfaction than the potential one.
This may require a policy intervention to solve the resulting inefficiency. To further support this
point of view, consider the perverse effect of differentiation: the “tyranny of choice” – a term
coined by Schwartz [19] – represents the situation when the abundance of available choices on
the market may even become undesirable if the consumer cannot count on a valid consciousness
to guide her selection. In this respect, some authors stress the role of advertisement in informing
consumers [20]. However, adverts may barely provide a neutral source of knowledge. Thus, the
model here proposed will show effects of advertising.
The relevance of information and knowledge in consumption is widely recognized, because
of their ability to influence the consumer’s attitude in perception and searching. Indeed, some
analysis supports the point of view that a lack of knowledge may truly generate a reduction of the
consumer’s judgement capacity [21]. In our opinion this conclusion cannot be fully ascribed to
the well-known “bounded rationality” concept, which appears more linked to the completeness
of the informative set, as advocated in [22, 23] and in [24]. In this paper we explicitly emphasize
the semantic difference between the two concepts of “information” and “knowledge”. Our in-
terpretation of these two terms relies on a suggested distinction between (i) what the consumer
knows with regards to the current transaction being concluded (which should be considered
as “information”, as generally accepted in literature), and (ii) what the consumer knows in a
broader sense, in the form of cultural background and capability to understand and to evaluate
1In other words, we refer to a higher-order differentiation concept, which embeds both the number of product
features and their intensity. More precisely, we implicitly take a multi-criteria approach, in which every feature
(including price) is suitably modeled and weighted: the reader can refer to literature about the multi-attribute
utility theory and the outranking approach, [11] [12].
2For a detailed analysis of the possible reasons why consumers seek variety, we refer the reader to [13].
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(which is a notion of “knowledge”). The interested reader may refer to existing surveys [25, 26].
A possible rationale for the reduction of the consumer’s judgement capacity can be ascribed to
the complexity of choice environment [27]. In fact, it is known that consumers decide to make
purchases for many reasons, which range from very basic needs to utmost volatile instincts. As
a consequence, even their perceived desires/needs and the way they are expressed respond to a
very wide set of stimuli, as documented in an ample literature [28, 29, 30]. Also, there is evidence
that choices made in consumption may affect the development dynamics of the economy [31].
We approach the problem of individual consumer’s choice by describing the different phases of
the informative process that leads the buyer to her final selection. In this sense, we assume that
the consumer is able to build an “experiential cognitive map”, where all the variables are taken
into account in a spatial sense. Our approach basically belongs to the well-known framework of
consumer decision-making research [32], which considers consumption as a process that generally
involves the following phases: (1) problem recognition (i.e., market selection according to the
need being satiated); (2) information search; (3) evaluation of alternatives; (4) final choice (i.e.,
purchase); (5) post-purchase evaluation. We assume that the consumer has chosen the market
where to enter, and focus on phases (2), (3), and (4). We will neglect phase (5).
In order to build a spatial configuration, here we use a Hotelling-type approach [3, 4], to
qualify the satisfaction in terms of the distance from the “perfect choice”. Our model informally
follows a multi-attribute approach: we assume that the consumer’s exploration will reveal her
behavioral attitude in recognizing and appreciating desired characteristics. Thus, the set of
available options is analyzed, and, after comparisons, the most satisfying alternative is chosen
[33, 34, 35].
Market complexity affects many aspects of the decision process. In fact, motivational ele-
ments and topological configurations of attributes space unavoidably link the maximizing choice
to the effort put in the search [36]. This is the reason why our model is based on two distinct
features: (i) the consumer’s ability in discriminating similar goods, and (ii) her knowledge of
the market structure. Furthermore, a very strong influence on present choices and decisions is
exerted by similar previous experiences [37, 38, 39, 40, 41]. As a consequence, we assume that
a purchase decision passes through an analysis that takes into account every cognitive element
of the consumer’s activity, either present or stored in memory from past experiences [42]. The
theoretical context employed here allows individuals to adaptively select strategies in order to
manage the actual situation at their best [43] [44].
In this paper, we investigate the existence of some “safety guidelines” to help consumers
with different degrees of information to make their choices. Inspired by previous studies on
the beneficial role of randomness in socio-economic systems, we actually test the effectiveness
of several strategies to reach a final decision, ranging from the hypothetical scenario of perfect
information, to a completely random walk. As it was found for financial markets [45, 46, 47,
48], for career advancements in managerial organizations [49, 50], and for efficiency of political
institutions [51], we anticipate that also in this case randomness gives positive results.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, in its static and dynamic
features. In Section 3 we run various types of simulations, and present numerical results. Con-
clusions and future directions of research are addressed in Section 4.
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2 The model: statics and dynamics
In this section we describe our model. We first deal with its static features, which are related
to the exogenous market structure (2.1), the endogenous consumer’s characteristics (2.2), and
the interaction between market and consumer (2.3). Successively, we describe the dynamical
procedure employed by the consumer to explore the market, gathering information in an attempt
to reach her target (2.4).
2.1 The market
The topological structure of the market is represented by a graph with three types of nodes,
identified by different shapes, see Figure 1(a). Formally, the graph has the theoretic structure of
a forest, that is, a free union of trees (connected acyclic graphs).3 Each tree is star-shaped, and
represents a “cluster”: for instance, the graph in Figure 1(a) has three clusters. The meaning
of the three types of nodes is described below.
Central nodes. These nodes are located at the center of the trees composing the forest, and are
denoted by pentagons. They are the hubs (i.e., highly connected nodes) of the graph, and
may represent either a “brand” or a “category” of products. For example, in the market of
cameras, we can look at each central node as a specific producer (Canon, Minolta, Nikon,
etc.) or as a type of camera (bridge, mirrorless, reflex, etc.).
Terminal nodes. These are the leaves of the forest (i.e., the nodes with degree 1), and are
denoted by circles.4 The terminal nodes represent all final products that are sold on the
specific market at hand. For instance, in dealing with the market of cellular phones, a
terminal node may be a 4-tuple of the type
〈
Apple , iPhone6 , 32 GB , silver
〉
.
Intermediate nodes. These are the nodes that belong to paths connecting the hub of a cluster
to the terminal nodes of the same cluster, and are denoted by squares. Intermediate nodes
represent the distinct phases of a consumer’s informative journey, intended as a cognitive
walk that guides her from a brand/category to a final product present in the market. To
illustrate the role of intermediate nodes, consider the following example in a computer
market. A consumer decides to buy a final product represented by the 6-tuple〈
Apple , Macbook Air , 13′′, i7 - 2.2 GHz , 8 GB SDRAM , 512 GB
〉
.
Here the central node is the brand 〈Apple〉, the terminal node is a laptop with some
specified features, and the intermediate nodes are all restrictions of the 6-tuple to the first
i components,5 with i = 2, 3, 4, 5. Thus, each product can be identified with an n-tuple of
3Recall that a graph G is a pair (X,E), where X is a nonempty set of nodes, and E is a (possibly empty) set
of (undirected) edges, with an edge being a subset of X having size two. Two distinct nodes x, y ∈ X are adjacent
if {x, y} is an edge in E. A path in a graph G = (X,E) is a sequence (x1, . . . , xk) of k ≥ 2 adjacent nodes, in the
sense that the set {xi, xi+1} is an edge in E for each i = 1, . . . , k − 1. A graph is connected whenever any two
distinct nodes are joined by a path, and is acyclic if there are no paths beginning and ending at the same node.
For further details, refer to [52].
4Recall that the degree of a node x is the number of nodes that are adjacent to x. The nodes adjacent to x
are also called the first neighbors of x.
5Specifically, the four intermediate nodes are
〈
Apple , Macbook Air
〉
,
〈
Apple , Macbook Air , 13′′
〉
,〈
Apple , Macbook Air , 13′′, i7 - 2.2 GHz
〉
, and
〈
Apple , Macbook Air , 13′′, i7 - 2.2 GHz , 8 GB SDRAM
〉
.
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(a) Topological structure of the market (b) Metric structure induced by consumer’s satisfaction
Figure 1: Graph representation of a market with three clusters. The clusters are identified by different colors.
The red edges in the right picture represent the consumer’s knowledge (which is “complete” in this case).
features specified by the sequence of n−1 informative steps needed to reach it, starting from
the central node (which represents its first feature). In this way, a product actually sold
in the market is completely determined by the topology of the cluster (brand/category)
to which it belongs.
It is important to emphasize that in our approach the market structure is totally exogenous.
Therefore, at this initial stage, the distinct clusters constituting the market are not connected
to each other, and live in a space that is not endowed with any metric structure.
2.2 The consumer
Once that both the number and the topological structure of the clusters are determined, the
market has to be evaluated by consumers. In fact, each (type of) consumer has different features,
preferences and perceptions, which constitute the “lens” through which the market is viewed by
her. Below we describe in detail how the consumer’s point of view may affect the representation
of the market, in terms of her: satisfaction, knowledge, and discrimination ability.
Satisfaction metric. The presence of a personal point of view naturally induces a deformation
of the graph structure, which however leaves unchanged the original topology of the market.
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In fact, the market assumes a shape that reflects the existence of an underlying satisfaction
metric, defined in an appropriate space and intrinsic to each (type of) consumer: see Figure
1(b), where, for the sake of graphical representation, we embed the graph into the two-
dimensional space (R2, d), with d denoting the standard Euclidean distance.
In order to better specify such an intrinsic satisfaction metric, we assume that each con-
sumer has in mind an “ideal goal”, a hypothetical target product with several well-specified
characteristics. This target, which may or may not exist in the market, occupies a specific
position in the Euclidean space, say, P ∗ ≡ (xP ∗ , yP ∗) ∈ R2. In particular, if the target is
a real product sold in the market, then it is located on a terminal node of the graph.
A natural assumption of our model is that a consumer purchasing her ideal product P ∗
will retrieve from it the maximum ex-post satisfaction, that is, Sat(P ∗) = 1. On the other
hand, purchasing a product different from her target and corresponding to a terminal node
P ≡ (xP , yP ) ∈ R2 will provide her with a non-perfect satisfaction, that is, 0 ≤ Sat(P ) < 1
in this case. Note that the satisfaction Sat(P ) retrieved from a non-ideal product P shall
naturally depend on the Euclidean distance d(P, P ∗) =
(
(xP − xP ∗)2 + (yP − yP ∗)2
)1/2
of the chosen product P from the target P ∗. More generally, we define the satisfaction
Sat(P ) associated to any point P ∈ R2 by
Sat(P ) := 1 − d(P, P
∗)
dmax
(1)
where dmax is the maximum possible distance in the bounded part of the considered space
R2 (which is a square, in our case). Due to its generality, this definition of satisfaction
works for any pair of nodes (not necessarily terminal).
It is important to note that in our model the distance between two terminal nodes is
independent from the set of features of the corresponding products. For instance, the top
blue node A and the lower red node B in Figure 1(b) – which are very far from each other
in the underlying metric space – might well have very similar features; nevertheless, it is
possible that the satisfaction deriving from buying A is very different from that deriving
from buying B, even just because they belong to different clusters.6 On the other hand,
the three nodes of different colors placed at the center of the metric space (C, D and E)
might present very different features despite being very close to each other (hence giving
a similar satisfaction to the consumer).
Knowledge of clusters. In reality, consumers’ knowledge of the exogenous market structure
may vary quite a lot. We measure knowledge in terms of perception of the existence
of clusters; those clusters that are known to the consumer are labeled as active. Figure
1(b) graphically describes a deformed topological structure of a simple market with three
clusters, as viewed by a perfectly informed consumer, i.e., a consumer with a maximum
knowledge Knmax = 1. In the represented case, the three clusters are all active, in fact
their central nodes are connected to each other by red edges (whereas the intra-clusters
links are colored in yellow). Note such a perfectly informed consumer could theoretically
6Just to give a concrete example, think to a consumer whose target is an Apple iPhone with certain particular
features: if she buys a Samsung Galaxy smartphone with very similar characteristics, then it is likely that she
will be much less satisfied, since in this specific case the importance of the brand dominates the other features of
the product.
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visit all the nodes of the graph during her informative journey, using both red and yellow
edges.
The situation is quite different for a consumer with an imperfect knowledge Kn < 1. In
Figure 2 we describe a market with seven clusters, as it is viewed by a consumer with a
knowledge Kn = 0.5: in this case only three of the seven clusters are active, hence the
informative journey of this type of consumer will be limited to the three corresponding
brands/categories. In Figure 2 we also represent the following additional features:
(1) A possible position of the consumer at the beginning of her journey over the graph,
indicated by a red human shape located on a node belonging to the top-right (active)
cluster. In what follows, we refer to this initial node as the source of her psychological
journey. (For example, in the process of searching for a new cellular phone to buy,
the consumer might start her exploration from the node of the graph that represents
– or is very close to – her old phone.)
(2) A possible position of her target product, indicated by a shape with concentric red
circles. In the represented case, the target is located on a terminal node of the middle-
right (inactive) cluster. (However, as already emphasized, the location of the target
may well fail to coincide with a terminal node of a cluster, thus indicating that the
consumer’s ideal product is not present in the market.)
In the described situation, despite the target coincides with a terminal node of the graph,
the consumer will never be able to reach it, due to her imperfect knowledge: in fact, the
target belongs to an inactive cluster. Therefore, the consumer’s greatest ambition can
only be to get as close as possible to her target, while remaining within the subset of the
market that is reachable by his partial knowledge.
Preference structure and discrimination ability. The last feature that influences the mar-
ket evaluation by the consumer is her preference structure. In our model, we assume that
the buyer has only a sort of “fuzzy” perception of the level of satisfaction associated to
each point of the graph, until he actually reaches a node and physically explores it. Specif-
ically, we distinguish (1) an “ex-ante perception”, which is the individual presumption of
the satisfaction that a good can provide; and (2) an “ex-post evaluation”, which is the
satisfaction that a good existing on the market actually provides. In this respect, the
level of satisfaction associated to a given node of the graph represents what we call its
“ex-ante utility”, which is just an estimate of its “effective utility” (measurable only after
the consumer physically explore the node). We model this fuzzy preference structure by a
total preorder on the set of nodes.7 This is a classical hypothesis in individual preference
theory. Since the number of nodes is finite, the advantage of this framework is that it
admits a utility representation with “thick” indifference classes.8
7Recall that a total preorder on a set X is a binary relation % on X, which is reflexive (x % x for each x ∈ X),
transitive (x % y and y % z imply x % z for each x, y, z ∈ X), and complete (x % y or y % x for each x, y ∈ X
such that x 6= y). In this case, the indifference relation ∼ associated to %, defined by x ∼ y if x % y and y % x,
is an equivalence relation on X.
8 A binary relation % on X is representable if there exists an order-embedding from X into the set R of real
numbers, i.e., a map u : X → R such that for each x, y ∈ X, we have x % y if and only if u(x) ≥ u(y). In this
case, the function u is called a utility representation of %. It is well-known that a total preorder on a countable
set (hence, in particular, on a finite set) is always representable: see, e.g., [53, 54] for a general discussion about
utility representations and some technical results.
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Figure 2: A market with seven clusters, as viewed by a consumer with moderate knowledge and high discrimi-
nation power. The consumer has a partial knowledge (Kn = 0.5) and a quite high number of indifference levels
(NLev = 14), represented by annuli with different shades of gray. The indifference areas are centered at the target,
which is located on a node, and is denoted by concentric red circles. The random initial position of the buyer is
located on a node of the top-right cluster, and is denoted by a human shape.
Figure 2 provides a graphical description of such a consumer’s preference structure. The
R2 space endowed with the satisfaction metric is partitioned into NLev equivalence classes,
called indifference levels and represented by concentric annuli centered at the target. All
the nodes in an annulus are ex-ante equally preferred by the consumer, i.e., they display the
same presumed utility:9 the further from the target an annulus is, the lower the presumed
utility associated to the corresponding indifference level is, and vice versa. Clearly, a low
value of NLev is typical of a consumer with a rather low ex-ante discrimination power,
whereas a large value of NLev indicates a consumer with a high ability in discriminating
among similar goods.
As a conclusive remark, note that we do not assume a priori the existence of a relationship
between knowledge and discrimination ability. Therefore, we can identify several “categories of
buyers”, which display various combinations of these two features. In the next subsection we
illustrate how consumers interact with the market structure, and how this interaction – along
with some additional individual features – determines different categories of consumers.
2.3 Market-Consumer Interaction
Each central node (hub) of the graph can be considered as a “pole of attraction” for the con-
sumer. In the case that hubs represent brands, the strength of such attraction depends on many
9Formally, if % is the total preorder on X representing the preference structure of a consumer, ∼ is the
indifference associated to %, and u : X → R is an utility representation of %, then we have x ∼ y if and only if
u(x) = u(y). So each annulus can be seen as a fuzzy multidimensional representation of indifference curves.
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factors, such as marketing suggestions, variety of offered products, advertising and promotional
campaigns, communications and brand-management policies, etc. To simplify our analysis, in
this paper we assume that the attractive power of a hub is only a function of the amount of
products having that brand. In fact – in analogy with the gravitational field of a body in physics
– we introduce the mass M of a hub, which is by definition equal to the number of leaves of
the corresponding cluster. Note that the attraction effect generated by each hub becomes effec-
tive only if the consumer is aware of the presence of the corresponding cluster: said differently,
“knowledge determines attraction”.
In Figure 3 we graphically represent the attraction field induced by the three active clusters
of Figure 2 (the four inactive clusters have no effect whatsoever on the consumer, since she
cannot even perceive their existence). For the sake of visualization, only the central nodes are
reported in the figure. The integer number next to each hub is its mass M , which provides a
discrete measure of the strength of directional attraction. The arrows of the attraction field may
possibly push the consumer to choose in a certain direction. However, not every consumer will be
affected in the same way by the field: in fact, as we shall argue later on, the more a consumer is
well aware of her personal tastes/goals, the less she is influenced by market suggestions. In order
to take into account this kind of behavior, next we introduce the last feature that characterizes
a consumer in our model.
Awareness. This is the capability of the consumer to discern the features of a product without
being subject to the influence of the market: the higher her awareness, the less likely that
she makes her choice according to the market’s attraction field. In fact, a highly aware
consumer will always take advantage of both her knowledge and her ex-ante discriminating
power to effectively explore the market while moving towards the target. In our model we
assume that awareness is a parameter Aw that varies in the closed interval [0, 1].
Knowledge (Kn), discriminating ability (NLev) and awareness (Aw) are the three parameters
that allow us to distinguish among several categories of consumers, characterized by suitable
combinations of these features. In Table 1 we list a taxonomy of cases, in which the extreme
values of the parameters better emphasize the differences among different types of buyers. In
particular, consumers from type #1 to type #5 (with Kn = 0.5) display an imperfect knowledge
of the market, while consumers from type #6 to type #10 (with Kn = 1) know the market
perfectly. Within each of these two general categories, we have the extreme cases of consumers
with either minimum (Aw = 0) or maximum (Aw = 1) awareness, as well as a special type of
consumer who – as we shall describe later on – walks along her informative path completely at
random. Finally, for non-random cases, we consider consumers with low and high discriminating
ability (respectively, NLev = 4 and NLev = 20).
These ten combinations of the main individual parameters describe a fictitious community
made by several distinct (non-interacting) consumers, who aim at maximizing their own utility
according to their subjective awareness, discrimination capacity and knowledge. As we explain in
detail in the next section, each type of consumer will navigate the graph in search of her (existing
or non-existing) target, following step by step (i.e., node by node) a personal informative path
starting at the source (where she is located at time t = 0).
Next, we anticipate the possible outcomes of the informative journey of a generic consumer.
Let tend be the total number of explorative steps done by the consumer, who starts her journey
at time t0. Further, let P be the product (present in the market) delivering the maximum
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Figure 3: Market-consumer interaction: attraction field induced by three active hubs. The label next to each hub
represent its mass, which is equal to the number of products (leaves) of the corresponding cluster. All intermediate
and terminal nodes are not represented.
satisfaction among the ones visited by her, and t∗ the step at which P is reached. (Thus,
time is discrete, and t∗ is an integer between t0 and tend.) If Sat(P, t∗) denotes such a maximum
satisfaction, then the individual journey may give rise to four possible outcomes for the consumer,
which depend on whether the target product exists (cases 1a and 1b) or not (cases 2a and 2b).
(1a) The target coincides with a real node of the graph, and is actually reached. In this case,
the consumer ends her search at the target P ∗ (i.e., P = P ∗ and t∗ = tend), and, following
Equation (1), her satisfaction is maximum (i.e., Sat(P ∗, t∗) = Satmax = 1).
(1b) The target coincides with a real node of the graph, but is not reached. In our model there
are no constraints on the time that each buyer can spend while searching for her target.
However – as we better explain in the next section – the consumer might eventually get
trapped in an “informative cul-de-sac”, in which case she will buy the product correspond-
ing to the maximum satisfaction reached until that moment. Specifically, if this maximum
satisfaction is given by a certain product P reached at time t∗, then the consumer’s satis-
faction Sat(P, t∗) is a number in the open interval (0, 1).
(2a) The target does not coincide with a real node of the graph, but the consumer reaches a node
at minimum distance from it. Whenever the ideal product does not exist in the market,
choosing the “closest” product to it (at, say, time t∗) is actually the best that the consumer
can do. As a consequence, her satisfaction “should” theoretically be maximum, even if she
will inevitable end her journey in a cul-de-sac. However, unless the consumer has a precise
perception that the ideal product is not present in the market, at the end of her journey
she will still believe that her original goal has not been fully accomplished. Therefore, as
in case (1b), we have again 0 < Sat(P, t∗) < 1.
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Consumer Kn Aw NLev
#1 0.5 0 4
#2 0.5 0 20
#3 0.5 1 4
#4 0.5 1 20
#5 0.5 random −
#6 1 0 4
#7 1 0 20
#8 1 1 4
#9 1 1 20
#10 1 random −
Table 1: Ten types of consumers characterized by different values of individual parameters. Only rather extreme
values of knowledge (Kn), awareness (Aw) and discrimination ability (NLev) are used. The special type of random
consumer also appears.
(2b) The target does not coincide with a real node of the graph, and the consumer does not even
reach a node that has the minimum distance from it. In this case, there are no doubts that
the consumer’s satisfaction is not maximum (in fact, lower than in the previous case). As
in cases (1b) and (2a), her final satisfaction corresponds to the maximum one reached (at,
say, time t∗) during her exploration of the market, before being (inevitably) trapped in a
cul-de-sac. Again, we have 0 < Sat(P, t∗) < 1.
Of course, the outcome effectively realized is also determined by several factors deriving
from the heterogeneity of individuals, such as the effects of advertising, a lack of knowledge, a
very inaccurate ex-ante preference structure, etc. Therefore, we expect that distinct types of
consumers – endowed with different levels of knowledge, awareness and discriminating power
– will behave quite differently. For instance, it is apparent that only consumers with Kn = 1
(from type #6 to type #10 in Table 1) will have the possibility to reach the target, provided
that the latter is a real product on the market (outcome (1a)). On the other hand, a lack of
connections between central nodes due to medium values of Kn (consumers from type #1 to
type #5 in Table 1) will likely hinder the achievement of the target, even in cases in which the
latter corresponds to a product existing in the market (outcome (1b)).
2.4 Dynamics of the model
We now describe how a consumer effectively moves from a given source toward her target. This
will enable us to evaluate differences among types of consumers in a statistically significant way.
To start, note that the fact that our consumer “has in mind” her target does not imply
any knowledge about its exact location with respect to the nodes of graph. As a matter of
fact, in the (rather unlikely) circumstance that the buyer possesses this perfect knowledge, she
would immediately select an existing product that is as close as possible to the target, and there
would be no explorative process. Instead, our model aims at describing the whole “consumption
experience” from a dynamical perspective.
Actually, we assume that, as soon as the need of a certain good is perceived,10 the consumer
has a (more or less) vague idea of what would satisfy her best. Thus, she starts her informative
10Here we do not explicitly address the question about the “repeated consumption” experience.
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Figure 4: Dynamical rules determining the buyer’s next move: the case of high awareness. The consumer is well
aware of the target, and tries to approach it by exploiting her high discrimination ability.
journey in order to find it, looking at the market structure according to her knowledge Kn, and
inspecting existing goods in a way that is influenced by her awareness Aw and her discrimination
ability NLev. Specifically, the consumer starts at time t = 0 from a randomly chosen source node
belonging to one of her active clusters, and moves at time t = 1 to another node of the graph,
following either a yellow link (connecting nodes of the same cluster) or a red link (going from
the hub of a cluster to another hub). At any time step t the consumer is on a certain node of
the graph, and at time t + 1 she moves to another node of the graph, following either a yellow
link or a red link. To describe the algorithm that guides the consumer’s selection at each step
of her journey on the graph, let us assume that at time t the consumer is on a given node j
with degree kj . Now the question is: how does the consumer select the neighbor node where to
go at time t+ 1?. In what follows, we give two distinct answers to this question, distinguishing
between the two main categories of consumers: (1) non-random; (2) random.
(1) For non-random consumers, the answer to the above question strictly depends on the values
of the parameters Aw and NLev. In fact, a consumer who is quite aware of her active segment of
the market (i.e., of all the products belonging to her active clusters) will theoretically be guided
only by her attempt to approach the target; on the other hand, the moves of a scarcely aware
consumer will be largely influenced by the attraction field induced by her active clusters, almost
independently of the position of the target. We translate these two opposite tendencies into,
respectively, the “dynamical rules” (a) and (b) described below.
(a) With probability p = Aw, the consumer chooses one the first neighbors with highest degree
among those with highest utility (according to her preference structure). More precisely,
first the consumer ranks all “reachable” indifference levels by the total preorder that models
her preference structure, that is, he determines the indifference level Li containing a first
neighbor that is the closest to the indifference level L0 of the target. If there is only
one first neighbor in Li, then she chooses it. Otherwise, she chooses randomly one the
first neighbors in Li among those having maximum degree.
11 The rationale guiding this
11In the majority of cases, there will be a unique first neighbor with maximum degree in the best reachable
indifference class.
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Figure 5: Dynamical rules determining the buyer’s next move: the case of low awareness. The consumer is
highly influenced by the attraction field induced by her active clusters, without consideration for the target.
selection process is very natural: the consumer selects according to a criterion of highest
possible utility, and, in cases of ex-equo, she makes her choice according to the highest
degree, since this selection increases her freedom of movement at the very next step of the
informative process.
In Figure 4 we represent the case of a highly aware consumer: at time t, she is on the hub
of a cluster, located in an indifference class that is two levels below the best. According
to our algorithm, at time t+ 1 the consumer will choose (with probability p = Aw) one of
the first neighbors that belongs to the best reachable indifference class. In our case, there
is only one node of this kind, namely A. Note that if node A were not to be present in the
graph, then the consumer would have chosen node C, since this is the node with highest
degree among the first neighbors in the best indifference level. For example, in Figure 4,
the two nodes C and B belong to the same indifference class, but C (with degree 6) is
better than B (with degree 1).
(b) With probability p = 1 − Aw, the consumer select a first neighbor on the basis of the
attraction field, without any consideration for the target. In the example shown in Figure
5, a scarcely aware consumer is influenced by the attraction generated by the three active
clusters (having masses equal to, respectively, 33, 19 and 8, as shown by the corresponding
labels), whereas the target is located on another (unknown) cluster. In this case, the
selection depends on the position j of the consumer at time t, according to the following
two subcases:
• if at time t the consumer is on a central node (position A in the figure), then at time
t + 1 she will move to one of her kj first neighbors with a probability proportional to the
mass of each node12; obviously, the central nodes of active clusters with a large number of
leaves have a very high probability to attract the buyer (in our example, the central node
with mass 19 will most likely be the buyer’s next choice);
12For nodes that are not hubs, the mass simply corresponds to their degree.
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Figure 6: Example of a cul-de-sac. In an attempt to reach her target, the buyer is exploring a branch of her
active cluster, but remains trapped in an informative cul-de-sac, and will end her journey on node G.
• if at time t the consumer is on an intermediate or a terminal node (position B in the
figure), then at time t+ 1 he will move at random to one of her kj first neighbors; in this
way, the consumer has the opportunity to explore all the informative trees in her active
clusters, without being forced to come back to the central nodes (which maximally attract
her).
(2) On the other hand, a consumer may decide to walk along her informative path completely
at random, that is, following the (red or yellow) links of her active clusters according to no
predetermined rule. In this case, at each time t the buyer will choose randomly one of her kj
first neighbors, and move toward it at time t + 1. One of the most remarkable results of this
paper is that the random strategy is far from being a losing one. In fact, it turns out that a
random walk over the (active clusters of the) graph will result more effective, in terms of utility,
than the analogous one influenced only by the attraction field (see Figure 5, in the extreme case
Aw = 0). This unexpected result is extensively discussed later in the paper.
Finally, we describe the termination of the algorithm, that is, how a given type of consumer
may end her informative journey. In this respect, we need to point out an additional feature of
the selection process, which affects the dynamical rules described above. In fact, the algorithm
puts a constraint on the number of times that a buyer can visit a given node of her active
subgraph: this upper bound is reasonably set as equal to the degree of the node itself. We
impose this limitation in accordance to the (realistic) assumption that a consumer should not
travel along the same path more than once. Therefore, after k visits, a node with degree k will
be “switched-off”, and it will be no longer possible to cross it.
In Figure 6 we show a buyer (with awareness Aw ∼ 0.5) who, starting from the central node
A, passes through the intermediate node B in order to visit the terminal nodes C, D and E. All
visited nodes at a certain stage are colored in dark green, which stands for “switched-off”. Now
imagine that, before going towards node F , the consumer comes back one more time to node
A (for example, because she is moving at random). When she finally walks towards F , node B
(which has degree k = 5) will be switched-off too, and the buyer’s fate is to remain trapped in
a cul-de-sac: in fact, she will end her journey on node G. As a consequence of this feature of
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the algorithm, the consumer can terminate her journey (at time t = tend) in two different ways,
described below.
(a) The consumer remains trapped in an informative cul-de-sac. (This situation may happen
regardless of the fact that the target coincides with an existing node of the graph or not.)
In this case, the consumer buys, among the products visited until the time tend, the product
P corresponding to the maximum relative satisfaction, and so Sat(P, t∗) < 1. The chosen
product P is located at the relative minimum distance d(P, P ∗) from the target P ∗ (see
Equation 1).13
(b) The consumer reaches her target and buys it. This can happen only if the target coincides
with an existing node that belongs to one of the active clusters. In this case, the algorithm
terminates at the target P ∗, and the satisfaction of the consumer is given by Sat(P ∗, tend) =
1.
We end this section by defining two measures of the consumer’s performance in the whole
process. The first one is the final utility U , defined as the maximum value of satisfaction obtained
by the consumer at time t∗ ∈ [0, tend] during her informative journey, that is,
U := Sat(P, t∗) (2)
The second one is the total efficiency H of the consumer’s experience, defined as
H :=
t∗
tend
. (3)
These definitions readily yield that the equality (U,H) = (1, 1) only holds in one case,
namely, whenever the buyer is able to reach his target (at time t∗ = tend). In all other cases, we
will have 0 ≤ U < 1 and 0 ≤ H < 1, with values depending on the individual parameters Kn,
NLev and Aw.
We aim at characterizing the ten types of consumers described in Table 1 by their respective
values of U and H. Note that each simulation run of the algorithm corresponds to a single
informative journey with fixed values of Kn, NLev and Aw. Further, the performance of each
type of consumer is obviously influenced by the random initial positions of both the buyer and
the target, as well as by the random selection of the active clusters. Therefore, in order to
obtain statistically significant result, we need to calculate U and H for each category of buyers
over many different simulation runs (events), starting from different initial conditions. The next
section is devoted to a detailed description of the implementation of this procedure.
3 Simulation Results
Here we present and discuss the obtained results. The market structure considered in the
simulations is the one represented in Figure 2, with seven clusters embedded in a satisfaction
space.
For the first five types of consumers described in Table 1 (with limited knowledge Kn = 0.5),
there are three active clusters (out of seven). For each type of consumer, we consider a set of
13Note that, since we are in the metric space R2 with the Euclidean distance, the visited node with minimum
distance from the target is essentially unique from a probabilistic point of view.
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(a) Distributions for consumers 1 to 5 (Kn = 0.5) (b) Distributions for consumers 6 to 10 (Kn = 1.0)
Figure 7: Market with “target on product”. Distributions of efficiency and final utility calculated over N = 25000
simulation events for the 10 types of consumers shown in Table 1. Dashed lines indicate levels of efficiency and
utility higher than 0.9.
50 simulations, called multievents, with different random choices of the three active clusters.14
Further, for each multievent we perform a set of 500 simulations, with different initial positions
of both buyer and target, for a total of N = 25000 events. Finally, over the whole set of N
events, we compute the distributions P (U) and P (H) of final utility U and total efficiency H,
respectively. The mean value of the final utility distribution is called Social Welfare, and is
denoted by W ; its standard deviation σ(W ) is reported, too. We also calculate the distribution
P (tend) of stopping times, and report its mean value T = 〈tend〉 and the corresponding standard
deviation σ(T ). For statistical significance, a similar set of N = 25000 simulations is also done
for consumers with complete knowledge, corresponding to types from #6 to #10 in Table 1.15
In what follows, we discuss the results of the simulations, separating the analysis of the
following two cases: (1) target on product, that is, the target coincides with a product existing
on the market; and (2) target off product, that is, the target is only ideal, since there is no
product on the market that perfectly corresponds to the consumer’s goal.
3.1 Target on product
Assume that the target coincides with one of the terminal nodes of the graph. In this situation,
consumers can in principle reach the target without remaining trapped in some informative cul-
de-sac; however, this result strictly depends on their knowledge, awareness and discriminating
ability. In Figure 7 we plot the distributions of both total efficiency and final utility for the 10
types of consumers. In particular, in panel (a) we consider consumers with limited knowledge
(Kn = 0.5), whereas in panel (b) we describe consumers with complete knowledge (Kn = 1).
It is expected that group (b) performs better than group (a), with respect to both efficiency
14Note that 50 simulations suffice since we have
(
7
3
)
= 35 possible choices of three clusters out of seven.
15Indeed, since Kn = 1 implies that the seven clusters of the market are all active and reciprocally connected,
there would be no need of averaging over the 50 randomly chosen different subsets of the active clusters. We
repeat the experiment only for the sake of completeness.
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and utility. It is also far from surprising that perfectly aware buyers (Aw = 1) are in a better
position than totally unaware ones (Aw = 0). In particular, only type #9 – who is endowed
with a perfect knowledge and awareness, and has a high discriminating ability NLev = 20 – is
able to reach her target in almost all the 25000 events, thus totaling the highest scores (equal
to 1) for both H and U .16
On the contrary, it is rather unexpected that random consumer types (#5 and #10) are
in a better position than the corresponding unaware ones (#1, #2, #6 and #7), since their
distributions are more shifted to the right. However, this seemingly strange effect can be ra-
tionally explained after a moment’s thought. Indeed, a consumer who moves around the graph
only according to the attractiveness of various brands, with no awareness of the market and no
discriminating ability whatsoever, is likely to be trapped into a “branding loop”: she blindly
wonders around the graph, being pulled and pushed in all directions by the strength of each
brand, and ends up loosing sight of her original goal. Under the same hypothesis, moving com-
pletely at random may result into a winning strategy, since independence from the attraction
field will likely allow the consumer to explore quite a few nodes before stopping her informative
journey.
To better appreciate the differences in performances among the various types of consumers,
in Table 2 we list the following values: the percentage of events with final utility U > 0.9 and
the percentage of events with total efficiency H > 0.9 (see dashed lines in all the plots of Figure
7), the social welfare W with its standard deviation σ(W ), and the average stopping time T
with its standard deviation σ(T ).
Consumer Kn Aw NLev H(%) > 0.9 U(%) > 0.9 W σ(W ) T σ(T )
#1 0.5 0 4 21 19 0.76 0.16 46 24
#2 0.5 0 20 21 20 0.76 0.15 46 24
#3 0.5 1 4 61 41 0.86 0.13 25 18
#4 0.5 1 20 44 47 0.88 0.11 21 18
#5 0.5 random − 22 27 0.79 0.15 43 24
#6 1 0 4 23 27 0.80 0.14 75 42
#7 1 0 20 23 27 0.80 0.14 76 42
#8 1 1 4 56 78 0.93 0.07 14 14
#9 1 1 20 93 94 0.97 0.07 7 5
#10 1 random − 23 46 0.85 0.14 60 39
Table 2: Market with “target on product”. Global quantities calculated over the N = 25000 simulation events
for the 10 types of consumers described in Table 1. We report, in order, the following quantities: the percentage
of events with final utility U > 0.9, the percentage of events with total efficiency H > 0.9, the social welfare W
with its standard deviation σ(W ), and the average stopping time T with the corresponding standard deviation
σ(T ).
As expected, the outcomes of both random consumers and those with no awareness do not
depend on the number NLev of indifference levels, apart from insignificant statistical fluctuations.
Table 2 also confirms a better performance of the group with total knowledge (Kn = 1) over
that with partial knowledge (Kn = 0.5). Within these groups, it is apparent the superiority
of totally aware consumers (Aw = 1) and, in particular, of consumer #9, not only concerning
H, U and W , but also regarding the average simulation time T : indeed, consumer #9 reaches
16Note that, however, the y-axis of her plots is truncated at 15000.
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(a) Percentage of events with total efficiencyH(%)>0.9 (b) Percentage of events with final utility U(%)>0.9
Figure 8: Market with “target on product”. Behavior of H(%) > 0.9 and U(%) > 0.9 as a function of Aw, for
Kn = 1 and NLev = 20. The case of a random consumer is also considered.
the target almost always (W = 0.97) and, in average, very quickly (T = 7), thus confirming
the effectiveness of our algorithm in conditions of perfect knowledge. Finally, data confirms the
better score of random consumers (#5 and #10) with respect to the completely unaware ones
(e.g., #2 and #7), in particular for what concerns final utility.
Figure 8 describes the behavior of efficiency H and utility U as a function of the consumer’s
awareness Aw. Specifically, the outcomes of H(%) > 0.9 and U(%) > 0.9 are reported for several
values of awareness, fixed Kn = 1 and NLev = 20; for the sake of comparison, results for random
consumers are also listed. Note that scores increase along with Aw and rapidly saturate, reaching
already their maximum value at Aw = 0.5. The interpretation of these results is rather natural.
On one hand, there is no need to be perfectly informed consumers in order to get the maximum
satisfaction from a purchase: in fact, a medium amount of information suffices. On the other
hand, for scarcely informed consumers, a small quantity of information about the market is
enough to overcome the performance of a random buyer. However, should one also take into
account the cost needed to gather information, it is likely that a random search strategy would
gain a better position in the total ranking.
We conclude the analysis of the case “target on product” by performing two important tests.
The first test aims at verifying the influence of the attraction field for the various types of
consumers. In Table 3 we list the percentage of events (over the total N = 25000 events) in
which each type of consumer ends her journey within one of the seven clusters of the graph,
ranked by the decreasing values of their mass M (these results are very robust, since the error
is less than 1%).
As expected (see Section 2.4), only consumers characterized by Aw = 0 are visibly attracted
by clusters with high masses, especially in case they are free of moving all over the graph (as
it happens for types #6 and #7, who possess total knowledge): the percentage of stops is
particularly high for the cluster with M = 33, and then it decreases along with decreasing
masses. For all the other types of consumers, including random ones, the different number of
stops in the various clusters is only due to obvious statistical effects: in fact, clusters with a
higher mass also possess a larger number of nodes, hence the probability that a buyer stops
within them is proportionally higher, even with no attraction effect whatsoever.
A second test concerns the effect of the number NLev of indifference levels, the parameter
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Consumer Kn Aw NLev M=33 M=26 M=24 M=19 M=17 M=12 M=8
#1 0.5 0 4 26 21 18 14 13 6 3
#2 0.5 0 20 29 18 17 16 11 6 3
#3 0.5 1 4 17 26 15 11 9 10 13
#4 0.5 1 20 17 23 10 11 11 11 16
#5 0.5 random − 19 22 22 13 10 9 5
#6 1 0 4 32 23 20 10 9 4 2
#7 1 0 20 32 23 21 10 9 4 2
#8 1 1 4 17 20 17 16 12 11 8
#9 1 1 20 22 20 17 13 11 9 7
#10 1 random − 21 22 21 12 11 8 5
Table 3: Test for attractive field in a market with “target on product”. The percentage of stops within each of
the seven clusters of the graph is reported as a function of their mass M .
Figure 9: Test for the role of indifference levels in a market with “target on product”. The percentage of events
with final utility greater than 0.9 is reported as a function of the number of indifference levels.
determined on the basis of the consumer’s preference structure. In Figure 9 we report the
percentage of events (over the total N = 25000) in which perfectly informed consumers (type
#9, with Kn = 1 and Aw = 1) reach a final utility greater than 0.9 as a function of NLev.
The analogous result for the random consumer (the same as in Figure 8(b)) is also reported
for comparison. It is apparent, on one hand, that the presence of only two indifference levels
(NLev = 2) does not help the informed consumer to perform much better than the random one
(only 17% more). On the other hand, more than twenty indifference levels (NLev > 20) do not
appreciably improve her performance. This explains why our simulations only take into account
the cases with NLev = 4 and NLev = 20.
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3.2 Target off product
Here we summarize the results of simulations – similar to those of the previous section – in the
case that the target is on a point of the two-dimensional metric space which does not coincide
with any terminal node of the graph. In this situation, even perfectly aware consumers cannot
reach the target, and their informative journey is destined to end in a cul-de-sac (at time tend).
17The previous tests are quite robust, and stay substantially unchanged when the target does not coincide with
an existing product. Therefore we will not repeat them in the next section.
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(a) Distributions for consumer types #1-5 (Kn = 0.5) (b) Distributions for consumer types #6-10 (Kn = 1)
Figure 10: Market with “target off product”. Distributions of efficiency and final utility calculated over N =
25000 simulation events for the 10 types of consumers. Dashed lines indicate levels of efficiency and utility higher
than 0.9.
However, since nothing prevents that consumers can approach the target quite early in their
journey, we expect high values of final utility for consumers with Aw = 1 and Kn = 1. On
the other hand, we also expect that, in the same conditions, efficiency is not so high as in the
target-on-product case: in fact, for the target-off-product case, the journey goes on even after
the consumer has reached her minimum distance from the target at time t∗, and so the ratio
t∗/tend might be quite lower than 1.
The distributions of both the efficiency and the final utility for the 10 types of consumers
is shown in Figure 10, where, as in Figure 7, in panel (a) we consider consumers with limited
knowledge (Kn = 0.5), and in panel (b) we display consumers with complete knowledge (Kn = 1).
The obtained results essentially confirms our expectations: group (b) performs better than
group (a), in particular for what concerns the final utility; further, perfectly aware buyers (with
Aw = 1) perform better than totally unaware ones (Aw = 0). It is worth noting, once again, the
surprising effect of randomness, namely, the good performance of random buyers with respect
to consumers with no awareness.
These trends find further support in Table 4, where we report details about the percentage
of events with total efficiency H > 0.9 and final utility U > 0.9, along with social welfare and
average stopping time (and the corresponding standard deviations). In general – comparing the
results to those of Table 2 – Table 4 shows lower scores for all observed variables (except the
stopping times, which are higher) and all consumer types, thus indicating a global performance
that is (naturally) worse than the analogous one in the target-on-product case.
In particular, comparing the performances of consumer #9, which is naturally the best type
in both the tables, one notice that in Table 4 the efficiency H > 0.9 drops from 93% down to
11%, while the utility U > 0.9 does not reach 90% (against a 94% of Table 2); at the same time,
the social welfare passes from 0.97 to 0.94, and the average stopping time increases from 7 to
33 time steps. On the other hand, comparing the random consumer #10 in the two tables, one
can see that the collapse of performance is less dramatic: this means that the random strategy
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Consumer Kn Aw NLev H(%) > 0.9 U(%) > 0.9 W σ(W ) T σ(T )
#1 0.5 0 4 18 19 0.75 0.16 49 25
#2 0.5 0 20 18 19 0.76 0.15 48 24
#3 0.5 1 4 34 33 0.84 0.12 35 15
#4 0.5 1 20 9 50 0.87 0.12 31 17
#5 0.5 random − 14 26 0.78 0.15 46 25
#6 1 0 4 19 25 0.80 0.14 79 42
#7 1 0 20 19 25 0.80 0.14 79 42
#8 1 1 4 31 64 0.91 0.11 47 19
#9 1 1 20 11 89 0.94 0.10 33 19
#10 1 random − 12 42 0.84 0.14 65 40
Table 4: Market with “target off product”. Global quantities are calculated over N = 25000 simulation events
for the 10 types of consumers. We report, in order, the same quantities as in Table 2: the results are very similar.
(a) Percentage of events with total efficiencyH(%)>0.9 (b) Percentage of events with final utility U(%)>0.9
Figure 11: Market with “target off product”. Behavior of H(%) > 0.9 and U(%) > 0.9 as a function of Aw, for
consumers with Kn = 1 and NLev = 20. The case of a random consumer is also considered.
confirms its superiority with respect to the completely uninformed one (visible by comparing
consumers #10 and #7 in Table 4), and seems also to be unaffected by the position of the target
(on or off product).
In Figure 11, the behavior of H(%) > 0.9 and U(%) > 0.9 (for buyers with Kn = 1 and
NLev = 20) is reported as a function of consumer awareness, as already done in Figure 8.
Compared with the latter, it immediately appears that the final utility trend – shown in Figure
11(b) – remains almost unchanged (it rapidly saturates to a maximum value that is just slightly
lower than in the target-on-product case), but the shape of the efficiency behavior looks now very
different: indeed, due to the impossibility to reach the target, the efficiency score never exceeds
30%, staying also below the one of the random consumer for any value of awareness. Thus,
considering both efficiency and utility, the random consumer’s performance results again quite
effective, not only with respect to the totally unaware consumers, but also with respect those
with Aw > 0: again, this is particularly relevant in view of the fact that gathering information
has a cost, and so randomness appears even more convenient than what one can derive from the
results of Figure 11(b).
Finally, let us to focus the attention on a strange effect visible in both Tables 2 and 4.
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Figure 12: Market with “target off product”: an example of the counterintuitive effect due to a small number
of indifference levels. In an attempt to reach her ideal target, a well aware and informed consumer with a low
discriminating ability (type #8 of Table 4) remains trapped in a cul-de-sac, yet her efficiency stays quite high.
Some reader may have noticed that, when consumers with Aw = 1 cannot reach the target
(because either Kn < 1 or the target is off product), the percentage of events with efficiency
H greater than 0.9 seems to decrease when the discriminating ability of consumers increases
(from NLev = 4 to NLev = 20), whereas (as expected) the final utility U(%) > 0.9 increases. This
happens, in particular, for consumer types #3 and #4 in Table 2, and types #3, #4, #8 and #9
in Table 4. Although counterintuitive at a first sight, such a behavior has a natural explanation
if one deeper analyzes how the efficiency of a consumer is affected by the presence of a small
number of indifference levels around the target (which is a symptom of a low discriminating
ability). In Figure 12 we show an example of informative journey for a consumer with Kn = 1,
Aw = 1 and NLev = 4, in the target-off-product case (that is, we are considering consumer #8
of Table 4). Due to her low discriminating ability, the buyer considers all the nodes within the
first indifference level (colored in black) as equivalent: therefore, guided only by the degree of
nodes, she wanders among the three hubs A, B and C, with only occasional raids down some
branches of the respective clusters, until she finally ends up in the branch where is depicted in
the figure. As one can see, she has reached (at, say, time t∗) the product placed at the minimum
possible distance from the target, and so her satisfaction – and, in turn, her utility – jumps to
its (relative) maximum value (see Equations (1) and (2)). However, her journey is bound to end
soon: in fact, due to the high number of previous visits, hub C has been switched-off, hence the
consumer’s fate is to remain trapped in a cul-de-sac. In particular, she will stop, after four more
steps, on node D at time tend = t
∗ + 4, thus producing an efficiency score very close to 1 (see
Equation (3)); on the other hand, her utility score may be quite lower than 1. Translated into
reality, this effect captures the behavior of an undecided (and possibly well informed) consumer
who, due to her scarce discriminating ability, oscillates for a while among different brands, and
suddenly decides to buy a certain product, even if it does not perfectly matches her target.
4 Conclusive Remarks
In this paper we have presented a graph-based model of consumer choice, which describes the hy-
pothetical cognitive journey that each individual experiences in the process of buying a product.
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The role of the causes that influence the decision is measured by means of behavioral differenti-
ation in several parametric simulations. Our results explicitly show the relevance of information
and knowledge, in the form of individual awareness, discriminating ability, and perception of
market structure.
We have focused our attention on some prototypical categories of consumers, taking in
account their subjectively distorted visions of the market, as it seems to happen in everyday
consumption experiences. Many of our results confirm what one would naturally expect: for
example, a perfect knowledge of the market structure paired with a high discrimination ability
and a good individual awareness usually determines a very satisfactory choice. On the other
hand, a few results of our simulations look rather surprising – and maybe intriguing – in terms
of individual satisfaction, efficient strategies, and decision procedures, and therefore call for a
deeper analysis of their explanation and consequences.
First of all, our model shows that consumers provided with a minimal level of knowledge
and information may unexpectedly reach very high levels of utility. This appears to be in sharp
contrast with the classical paradigm that “perfect information is mandatory to obtain optimal
results”. However, considered that actual markets are far from being characterized by perfect
information, our results provide some justification for more realistic approaches, which do not
rely on perfect information as an unquestionable tenet of optimality.
Second, the results of our simulations consistently suggest that whenever consumers fail to
have a minimal level of knowledge and information, random decisions will make them better off.
This translates into a new type of behavioral strategy, which may operate as a sort of protective
shield for the unaware category of consumers. Said differently, a consumer, who wants to avoid
that social-economic forces – advertising, bandwagon effects, persuasive market power – may
well defeat market attraction by employing a random approach, especially since the latter is free
of charge. It is worth noting that a random behavioral model could be a source of inspiration
for alternative strategies of both firms and policy makers, for example concerning new anti-trust
and competition laws.
A last consideration arising from the results of our simulations concerns the emerging cat-
egory of the “informed-but-undecided” consumer. In fact, for this peculiar type of buyers, it
turns out that the higher their discrimination ability is, the worse their efficiency in consumption
becomes. This seeming counterintuitive effect has however an explanation: with a great capacity
to distinguish differentiated characteristics of goods, the final efficiency can be very high just in
case of few indifference levels.
Further research will be devoted to applying variations of our model to different types of
decision problems.
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